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reverses the former outcomes, and turns the Leontief paradox no paradox accordingly. Re the SS theorem this paper 
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pondering the meaning of bribing squarely under the light of the ‘ideal types’ model proposed herein. The paper 
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 The Simplest Possible 2x2x2 CGE Diagranomics: 
Revisiting the H-O, S-S Orthodoxies 
 
Introduction 
In a similar workshop a year ago (2004) I presented my report with the following verbiage: 
 
For the last several years I have been teaching my microeconomics courses even for freshmen what the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem is all about. How do I do it? This note attempts a brief account of how I do 
it as an alpha part exercise for the Tokyo Workshop on the “Alpha and Omega Topics in International 
Trade and Finance”. The alpha here connotes something both elementary and substantial, while omega 
implying something highly advanced and comprehensive. 
 
In what followed I assumed, as I do in class for an alpha exercise, two identical countries, identically 
endowed with homogeneous labor and capital (two factors). Pursuant to these basic assumptions I presented a 
simple (perhaps the simplest possible) diagrammatic account of the Stolper-Samuelson theory in a fully general 
equilibrium framework. 
My class adventure reveals a bitter maxim of free trade. Underlying the proposed diagranomics 
pedagogica, is a more formal system of mathematical equations also shown in my workshop paper. The paper’s 
Section 2 presented a fairly general EBD representation of optimal resource allocation and related income 
distribution. Section 3 in turn tried to interpret the Jensen-Larsen growth model within the confines of my simple 
diagranomics, followed by Section 4 conclusions. 
Among some intriguing comments offered by the then workshop participants I found Kaku Furuya’s the 
most intriguing. According to him I might as well set aside my critique of Stolper-Samuelson’s proposal on income 
redistribution to overcome the difficulty of free trade. He then suggested that my model be used to shed some new 
light on the orthodox H-O model and its basic predictions. Specifically starting with the same basic H-O model, 
what assumptions, say, on taste differentials may reverse their well-known conclusion of the H-O theorem. The 
purpose of my present piece is three-fold. First I will accept Furuya’s suggestion to treat the H-O model with my 
ideas on taste differentials in addition to H-O’s ideas on different endowments. My second task as an adamant old 
man’s is to get back to my old model to probe what Stolper-Samuelson had to say upon proposing to “bribe” the 
adversely affected class. And my third task is to revisit the Jensen-Larsen growth model using my 2x2x2 static 
model and related diagranomics. 
 
Section 1 The Orthodox HO vs. Heretical H.O. 
  Consider two countries, labeled N and B, producing nuts and bananas. Assume that N is endowed with 
 1 more capital and less labor than B that is oppositely endowed to produce nuts and bananas, respectively. The two 
nationals share the same tastes for the produces under consideration. The production functions for each good (i=N, 
B) are identical between the two countries and are linear homogeneous with variable factor proportions. Derived 
from these basic assumptions are the following autarky equilibria identified as EN
A and EB
A on the PPF of the 
Nutties and that of the Bananans. 
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We now turn to H.O. heresy(?) which is predicated on the same assumptions as HO’s but one: 
tastes are different between the two trading nations. 
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Figure 2 H.O. Heresy 
 
 







Then:  N exports N, and B B. N’s capitalists 
and  B’s workers gain and the other 








N exports B, and B N. N’s workers 
and B’s capitalists gain while the other 
classes lose after trade. 
Then 
The Same Assumptions but on 
Tastes, which are now different 
Country  N is capital-rich and Country B 
labor-rich. Sector N is capital intensive and 
Sector B labor intensive. Tastes are identical. 
Assume: 
N
A  Etwo nations remain small enough. But if and when tastes become sufficiently different for the two nationals as 
illustrated by Figure 2, then the HO theorem is reversed. It is its labor-intensive sector that is to be the capital-rich 
country’s export sector, and capital-intensive goods N are to be imported. This may make the Leontief paradox is no 
more paradox than the H.O. heresy is, should it sound paradoxical. 
 
Section 2 SST Diagranomics 
After introducing the concept of the iso-quant map, followed by the concept of MRTS and the related 
law of diminishing MRTS, I draw a nonlinear (monotone) contract curve (as well as a linear one) over a square 
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Figure 3 EBD of Endowments, 
Back-to-Back Iso-Quants and Contract 
Figure 4 Production Possibilities 
Set and Frontier 
 
Two Laws of Importance of Being Different 
From this I either assert or demonstrate (geometrically) that a concave production possibility frontier 
can be derived, say, as Figure 4. Related to a red PPF is a red CC; blue PPF related to a blue CC. In this related vein 
I emphasize that being different in the methods of production in the two sectors has an important meaning as it 
enlarges the production possibilities set! I refer to this as the first law of importance (or beauty) of being different, 
followed in turn by the second law of importance (or beauty) of being different (in tastes). 
Related to both laws of importance of being different is the concept of autarky, followed by that of trade. 
I identify arbitrarily two points of autarky equilibrium on the PPF. Prerequisite to this is the concept of the 
indifference map. Using two indifference curves to identify two distinct autarky equilibria along the PPF, I also 
explain the law of increasing marginal cost of either good in terms of the other good forgone, followed by the p = 
MC principle under conditions of perfect competition. You can produce either bananas or nuts by employing labor 
and capital optimally to maximize profit. Related to the two autarky points on the PPF are two corresponding points 
of optimal resource allocation identified along the contract curve. 
Related to the contract curve is the concept of MRTS along an iso-quant curve. I explain how this ratio varies along the contract curve, and why. In this connection I find it very helpful for the student to start with a 
reference point (circled in red, Figure 5) along the contract curve where MRTS = 1 to intuitively appreciate its 
relation to factor prices. Assuming competitive equilibrium (in the factor market) requires relative factor prices to be 
equal to this MRTS, yields w/r = 1. 
I then ask students what would happen to the factor intensities (say, capital/labor ratios) and factor prices 
as well if and when the productive optimum points and related factor combinations move along the contract curve, 
deviating from the reference point in Figure 5 circled in red. Compare it with a green circle point, the lower left 
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Figure 5 Trade and Factor price Equalization    Figure 6 Productive Optimum before/after Trade 
  It goes without saying that production possibilities frontier PPF can readily be derived from or related to 
the contract curve of Figure 5. Figure 6 illustrates how points E
AB, E
AN and a red point in-between along the PPF are 
related to those along the contract curve of Figure 5. 
  
The Third Law of ‘Importance of Being Unimportant’ 
At this stage I also introduce a third law of importance, the concept of the “importance of being 
unimportant” in income distribution. The message stressed here is that the more minor a specific sector, say, 
capital-intensive sector, the higher the factor payment to its sector’s non-intensive factor, say, labor (not only in the 
minor sector itself, but also in the major sector as well). This is because the minor sector’s labor, which is scarce, 
becomes increasingly scarcer, thereby making the value of a marginal worker increasingly higher. 
To cement this idea of ‘importance of unimportance’ suppose the capital-intensive sector shrinks. This 
requires the labor-intensive sector to expand. Then what happens to this labor-intensive sector’s capital intensity? It 
increases, too. Thus, the overall capital intensity tends to increase when labor-intensive sector expands while the 
capital-intensive (minor) sector shrinks to become even more minor. Both sectors becoming more capital-intensive 
means that labor is becoming relatively scarcer. This is the underlying reason why wage rate must be increasing as  5 
both sectors become increasingly more capital intensive, or more pointedly as the (minor) capital-intensive sector 
diminishes by reallocating part of its scarce labor to the expanding (major) labor-intensive sector. Labor’s value at 
the margin must increase as both sectors compete for the scarce labor that the minor capital-intensive sector has. 
 
Factor Abundance Defined, or Redefined 
Now consider conditions before trade. Different tastes yield distinct autarky equilibria with different 
prices, both products and factor prices for two countries. Different prices induce trade, which tends to equalize not 
only product prices, but also factor prices. This does not require the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of different factor 
endowments. Relative factor scarcity or abundance cannot be simply defined in terms of different factor 
endowments, but instead they ought to be defined in terms of different factor prices. If one country’s wage rate is 
higher than the other country’s wage rate, then that country must be defined to have scarcer endowment of labor. 
It is then the differences, if any, in prices and related factor prices that induce international trade. 
However, trade tends to equalize product prices and factor prices as well regardless of different or identical factor 
endowments. And regardless of factor endowments the scarcity of any given factor can be defined in terms of factor 
price differentials, which tend to be equalized by trade. Note in this process of factor price equalization that the SS 
magnifying effects of changes in product prices upon an individual factor owner’s welfare are inescapable. 
 
Adverse Welfare Effects of Trade: The Stolper-Samuelson Magnifying Effects 
To appreciate the SS magnifying effect more fully, assume tastes are different such that everybody is 
equally paid only after trade. (This requires symmetric taste differences between the two nations assumed, 
identically endowed, however for simplicity, with K = L = 1, or, equivalently, equal numbers of workers and 
capitalists each endowed with one unit of labor and capital, respectively.) But remember output elasticities for a 
given factor are different in two sectors.) Then despite the full equality in income distribution attainable after trade, 
each country will find its richer class, either labor or capital, to lose from trade. Trade is therefore no good news to 
the rich class in each country. Unless the rich are promised a transfer in an amount that will keep them richer than 
the poor class after trade, they may have no incentives for free trade. The poor, by comparison, would only catch up 
with the rich in income distribution after trade. The poor may accordingly feel that the rich does not deserve any 
transfer from the poor. 
  Stolper and Samuelson may have wanted to show how the poor (or any other specific class adversely affected 
by trade) may deserve protection? However, the SST model reveals an intrinsic difficulty inherent in any such 
transfer proposed. Why? While free trade benefits all in terms of national income (welfare) increase, the adversely 
affected class, poor or rich, may naturally demand compensation. But if the rich were to be compensated via a 
transfer from the beneficiaries of free trade who remained unfairly poor (or rather unjustly poor) before trade, would 
the poor accept any such transfer from them to the rich? Would they deserve it? Theoretically they wouldn't. For any  6 
transfer for a Pareto improvement implies a de facto deviation from the state of factor price equalization, keeping 
the poor before trade from becoming just equally rich as the former rich. There seems to be no justifiable excuse for 
the former rich to remain rich after trade via a transfer from the poor. Government intervention is therefore not 
warranted. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 'theoretically' reveals the maxim of no government intervention. 
  A subtle distinction between 'justice' and 'fairness' may be warranted also. We are endowed with 
discriminatory amounts of talents and/or assets from our ancestors, or Heaven. That is unfair. But assuming that God 
is not to blame for this, and if market mechanism prevails, then factor payments will be made in accordance with 
one's value marginal contribution, given one's endowments. If such equilibrium were prevented by market 
imperfections including lack of free trade, it might be called unjust. Any regulation to prevent market from properly 
functioning may be called unjust rather than unfair. 
  It often is the rich who cries for their protection for the sake, or in the name, of the "poor", but in fact they are 
unjustly justifying their benefit to be protected as a vested interest, or vested authority. The Stolper Samuelson 
model reveals it. 
  What if the poor becomes poorer after trade? To answer this question note that the poor before trade 
intra-nationally is rich internationally. On what basis do they deserve protection from competition from the poor 
abroad who are equally capable as the domestic poor? 
 
Edgeworth Box Diagram of a 2x2x2 GE Model 
Figure 7 below illustrates how both productive optimum and consumptive optimum may be obtained 
within a single Edgeworth box of production and consumption. In the box a concave production possibility curve 
PPC for nuts is shown to be tangent to another PPC for bananas. The back-to-back PPCs are shown to define general 
equilibrium of production at the point of tangency. Identified at this point of equilibrium EP* are both productive 
optimum and relative prices of bananas and nuts. Given the relative price of bananas (relative to nuts) as the slope of 
what I call income line, consumer optimum is also identified along the income-line-turned budget line at EC*. 
Here also note that two back-to-back community indifference curves are shown to be tangent to each other. Note 
further that these indifferent curves indicate respectively strictly higher community welfare than at E
NA, autarky 
equilibrium for the Nuts Country, or E
BA, autarky equilibrium for the Banana Country. The Nutties go bananas to 





                                                
 
N                                                      
                                                         r
B
 
                          
 
                                                                   
                        B                                                               
Nutties Indifference Curve 
Bananans 
Indif. Curve 




N   B     r
N
Figure 8 Budget Lines and Income 





ANE *  P E
NA
Figure 7 The EBD of General Equilibrium: 




Free Trade as a Difficult Proposition in Principle, besides in Practice 
  Figure 7 thus shows that trade helps to enlarge not only the size of the Edgeworth box (over and above a 
dotted box inscribed representing an EB before trade), but trade also increases each country’s community welfare. 
Why is then free trade so adamantly resented? And resented by whom? 
  Figure 8 answers this question by individual budget lines and related income expansion lines in each 
country before trade and after trade. The two downward-sloping lines in blue are budget lines for the Nutties’ rich 
capitalists and the poor worker before trade. Note they are parallel (and flatter than the green lines). Note also that 
the blue (or green) budget lines are intersected with a unique income expansion line identifying each income class’ 
point of consumptive optimum. The two budget lines in green, by contrast, are the Bananans’ rich workers’ and poor 
capitalists’ before trade with their income expansion line also in green identifying their consumptive optimum (at 
points intersected by the budget lines). 
The budget lines in blue are flatter than those in green. This means that prices, or marginal costs, of 
bananas are lower for the Nutties than for the Bananans before trade. 
Note finally that a single solid line in purple represents the unifying budget line for all income classes in 
both countries after trade. Everybody being endowed with either one unit of labor or capital will be equally paid 
after trade wherever he lives. Two distinctively different income expansion paths in purple reflect taste differences 
between two nations even after trade, however. In any case what happens to each income class’ welfare after trade 
should be clear enough to confirm aforementioned intra-national as well as international conflicts that free trade 
provokes. The adversely affected income classes finding their enemies being either foreigners or own folks, but in  8 
any case may feel that they deserve protection. 
But do they? Aren’t they simply whining? Stolper-Samuelson’s concluding remarks that suggest to 
“bribe the poor” (or the rich adversely affected in our example) for market opening may call for a deeper scrutiny to 
determine on what basis bribing may be legitimate. I find none. This in a nutshell is my tentative conclusion of my 
alpha topic in economics in general and international trade in particular. 
 
Section 3 A 2x2x2 CGE Approach to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
Underlying the foregoing diagranomics is a more formal 2-sector, 2-factor, 2-country model of general 
equilibrium of production, trade, and consumption. A simple 2x2x2 CGE representation of the model is readily 
available subject to the basic theoretical requirements such as variable proportions and linear homogeneity. The 
system of equations is given as follows. (For the simplest possible CGE analysis with differentiated, rather than 
identical, tastes, both utility functions and production functions may be differentiated with the minimum possible 
parameters such as those underscoring Figures 9 and 10, pp. 10 - 11 below.) 
 





i),      i  =  N, B (Countries) 
where U
i is Country i’s utility as a function of nuts N
i and bananas B
i that i’s citizens consume. Citizens have 







i)/pi   i  =  N, B (Countries) 
where U1
i is Country i’s MU of the first good or nuts N
i,U2
i is Country i’s MU of the second good or bananas, and p 
is the relative price of bananas in terms of nuts assumed as the numeraire. Note also here that N and B in bold face 
letters stand for countries producing the goods N and B, respectively. 
2. Identical Production Functions: 
  N = f(KN
i, LN
i),   i  =  N, B (Countries) 
  B = g(KB
i, LB
i), i  =  N, B (Countries) 
where f and g stand for production functions for nuts and bananas, respectively, both being functions of capital K 
and labor L, but each function is identical internationally. That is, f and g are different intra-nationally, but each is 
identical internationally as a function. 
3. Factor Demand/Supply (Allocation) Equilibrium Conditions: 
 K N
i + KB
i = K(=1),  i = N, B (Countries) 
  L N
i + LB
i = L(=1),  i = N, B (Countries) 
where both endowments are normalized, though not needed, to unity for simplification. 
4. First-Order Conditions for Productive Optimum (Before Trade): 
  wi = f2 = pig2,   f2 = f(kN
i, 1) − kN
if1(kN
i, 1) = φ(kN
i),   g2 = g(kB
i, 1) – kB
ig1(kB
i, 1)= γ(kB
i),   i  = N, B  9 
  ri = f1 = pig1,   f1 = f1(kN
i, 1)= φ (kN
i),   g1 = g1(kB
i, 1) = γ(kB
i),  i = N, B 
5. Budget Constraints for Capitalists and Workers (Before Trade): 
  ri = NK
i + piBK
i, i  =  N, B (Countries) 
  wi = NL
i + piBL
i, i  =  N, B (Countries) 
6. Law of Equi-Marginal Product of Labor per Dollar (After Trade): 
f2/w = pg2/w 
7. Law of Equi-Value Marginal Product of Capital (After Trade): 
r = f1 = pg1 
8. The Law of Equi-Value Marginal Product of Labor (After Trade): 
w = f2 = pg2
9. Law of Equi-Value Marginal Product of Capital per Dollar (After Trade): 
f1/r = pg1/r 
10. Law of Equi-Marginal Rates of Technical Substitution (After Trade): 
w/r = f2/f1 = g2/g1  
11. Budget Constraint for Everybody (After Trade) 
  r = w = Nj
i + pBj
i,     i   =   N, B; j = L, K 
 
Section 4 EBD of 2x2x2 CGE: An Example 
  We have so far assumed that not only factor endowments but also production technologies are the same 
between the two countries N and B, but the production functions for the two sectors within each country are 
different. We now specify below the forms of the production functions in terms of output elasticity of production 
alone for simplicity. Moreover, we employ only one parameter α while assuming the Cobb-Douglas type for both 
the production functions to differentiate the two sectors’ methods of production, namely: 
  The N Sector: N
i = KN
iαLN
i(1−α),  i  =  N, B 
  The B Sector: B
i = KB
i(1−α)LB
iα,  i  =  N, B 
where the subscripts N and B refer to the nuts sector and the banana sector, and the superscript i (=N, B) stands for 
Country N (for nuts) or B (for bananas). 
The following observations on the properties of the production functions above are important. 
1) When α = 1/2: The two production functions are identical. 
2) When α > 1/2 (α < 1/2): The N sector is capital intensive, and the B sector is labor intensive. (The N 
sector is labor intensive, and the B sector is capital intensive.) 
3) The larger the parameter α (exceeding 1/2), the higher the capital intensity of the capital-intensive N 
sector is, and the higher the labor intensity of the B sector by comparison, and vice versa. [That is: 
The lower the α (below 1/2), the higher the labor intensity of the labor-intensive N sector.]  
Optimal Resource Allocation Requires the Law of Equi-MRTS of L for K: 
  Focusing on one country for the time being, and omitting the superscript i accordingly, the following 
optimization conditions are to be observed along a contract curve, which is concave (when α > 1/2) or convex 


















  This combined with the conditions of a given endowment of L and K, which are assumed both to be 












Assuming α = .9 for simulative purposes yields: 
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Figure 9 Given α, Arbitrary LN Determines KN, Hence (LN , KN ) as a One-to-One Correspondence   
             with  (B,  N),  and  Equilibrium Factor Price Ratio w/r (=MRTS) 
 
 10 Factor Allocation and Related Income Distribution: General EBD Representation 
  For a more general CGE analysis let us probe an Edgeworth box of endowment for concrete 
characterization of factor allocation and related income distribution under fairly general conditions of well-defined 
production functions for the assumed two sectors. 
         α  :   O u t p u t   E l a s t i c i t y   o f   N   w .   r .   t .   K                                                   
   ( 1 − α): Output Elasticity of B wrt K 
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α > 1/2 
α < 1/2 
α = 1/2 
MRTS = w/r = 
K/L (= 1 here) 
Figure 10 The EB Partitioned to Represent Factor Allocation and Related Income Distribution 
In the Figure above the darker areas imply factor combinations that yield the higher wage rates 
and shares relative to rent on capital. 
 
Section 5 Jensen-Larsen Model Simplified under the Light of H.O. Diagranomics 
This section briefly reviews a recent contribution by Jensen and Larsen (2004) on general 
equilibrium model of growth in terms of commodity price CP, factor price FC, and output mix on 
the production possibilities frontier over consumption goods J and investment goods I. We 
confine our attention on their multi-sector model to the one with two sectors only following 
along our analysis above. Moreover, abstracting from trade, we deal with a 2x2 model of general 
equilibrium while generalizing the production functions assumed to the extent that elasticities of 
substitution are no longer limited to unity. 
  In what follows we will show how different elasticity of substitution parameters σ in 
different sectors of production are related to the convexity/concavity of the contract curve in the 
factor endowment space, capital intensity k, relative factor price ω (=w/r), and commodity price 
p (=pi/pj). Simple Edgeworth box diagrams and related back-to-back diagrams can be used to do 
the job. We also probe the impact of growth upon the form of contract curves and related 
production possibilities set. An interesting example case is when one sector’s σ is large (> 1) and 
the other small (<1). As capital accumulation proceeds with a rise in capital intensity k, we can 
see, as Figure 11 below illustrates, how price in the elastic sector tends to rise initially, but followed by a decline eventually. 
 
Figure 11 Jensen-Larsen Model: Case 1.3 (or Case 1.4) 
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Relations of Sectoral ki’s to CPFP, Given σj > 1, σi < 1, and k at k = k0, k*, k1
 12  
Figure 11 illustrates how relative commodity price CP is related to relative factor price 
FP, and FP to sectoral capital intensities ki’s as well as aggregate capital intensity k. The last two 
panels above show how according as either ‘σj low and σi high’ or ‘σj high and σi low’ ω tends to either rise or 
decline as relative price changes along the PPF. Let us probe deeper below. 
1) Given different elasticities of substitution, say, σj < 1 and σi > 1, economic growth in terms of increasing capital 
endowments and related increases in capital intensity (from, say, k0 to k* to k1) must expand the more 
capital-intensive sector more than does the less capital-intensive sector, be it the capital goods sector j or the 
consumption goods sector i. 
2) Any particular sector, say, capital goods sector, may be capital intensive at an earlier stage of growth. But a 
continued growth must eventually reverse each sector’s factor intensity insofar as the one elasticity of 
substitution is assumed as small and the other large. 
3) The relative wage rate ω tends to increase monotonically with the aggregate capital intensity, but the product 
prices, say, in the consumption sector i, that may also increase with ω initially (as does under the present 
parameter combinations) must peak out eventually while ω keeps increasing. 
4) Opposite relations must hold for the other sector’s prices. Prices, say, in the capital goods sector must decline 
initially as ω increases, but the decreasing prices must bottom out eventually and start rising as ω keeps 
increasing with capital accumulation. 
 
k1                                             J :   k j(ω)           J  
                               ω                   σj<1 
                                          σi>1 
  k *                                                  I :   k i(ω) 




                                        k 0,  k*k1                                 
p                k 0,  k*k1    I 
           F i g u r e   1 2   Impact of Growth upon Contract Curves, and PP Sets 
 
5) Short-Run (Given k) Results: Summary Proposition A 
Wages may either rise or fall if and when any structural changes take place along a given production possibilities 
frontier according as either the one sector’s elasticity is small and the other large or oppositely large and small. 
Related to this is either a concave or convex contract curve reflecting relevant differences in the method of 
production in two sectors.  14 
6) Short-Run (Given k) Results: Summary Proposition B 
When k is small enough a rise in real wages can be accompanied by a fall in a given sector’s output, say, in the 
capital good sector if its elasticity of substitution is small enough relative to the other sector, and vice versa. (The 
importance of being unimportant for workers’ welfare requires elasticity of substitution for the minor (capital 
good) sector to be small enough relative to the other sector.) 
7) Short-Run (Given k) Results: Summary Proposition C 
When k is large enough wages increase with the small elasticity of substitution sector. 
8) Long-Run Results A: Early Stage 
Growth at an early stage requires lower real wages and higher capital good prices relative to consumption goods 
in order to reallocate resources to promote the capital good sector. 
9) Long-Run Results B: Intermediate Stage   
Growth in terms of increasing k tends to raise consumer prices (a la Balassa-Samuelson effects?) along with 
wage rates. The prices that may have been decreased in the short run must start to rise as the PPF shifts out with 
a particular skew, strictly steeper (and linear) than ever. 
10) Long-Run Results C: Mature Stage 
However, consumer prices will eventually peak out as growth continues with rising wages, consumer prices must 
start falling thereafter. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Probing the classic SST within the confines of a simple diagranomics has led to some interesting discoveries or 
rediscoveries of fundamental principles of economics revealing the importance of being different not only in 
technology (human capability as well), but also in tastes. The importance of being unimportant in income 
distribution is another discovery under well-defined conditions. Our inquiry also revealed why free trade is such 
a difficult proposition not only in practice, but also more disturbingly in theory. We suggested that the S-S 
suggestion to “bribe the poor” or the rich might not be a good idea. We also briefly examined the Jensen-Larsen 
models of economic growth and trade. We find that there is nothing that keeps wages from rising unless checked 
by free trade with the rest of the world. But the rest of the world being endowed with abundant labor in the scale 
of billions perhaps, the rich working class in the highly developed countries could be one of the stumbling blocks 
to free trade. However, the factor price equalization won’t materialize without free trade and/or mobile factor 
movement, which may be either resented by vested interest groups in both developed and developing countries or 
else simply averted in considerations of various risk and uncertainty related to health, security, mores, and more. 
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